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Notes
The Right of an Accused
To Proceed Without Counsel
The Gideon decision requires that every person accused
of a serious criminal offense be afforded counsel. The
author of this Note considers the treatment to be ac-
corded an accused who expresses a desire to proceed with-
out counsel. He discusses the origin and nature of the
right to waive counsel and the interests of society which
compel the application of certain restrictions upon the
exercise of this right. He concludes that a defendant
should be permitted to forego legal assistance only if he
thoroughly appreciates the consequences of doing so and
if the interest of society in providing a fair and orderly
trial are not thereby compromised, and suggests pro-
cedures by which trial judges may determine whether
these standards have been met.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the newly won availability of counsel to every person
facing serious criminal charges' and the obvious advantage to
be derived by an accused from professional legal assistance,2 a
number of criminal defendants waive their constitutional right to
counsel and attempt to defend themselves.3 The reasons for doing
so are many and varied. The defendant may feel he can do a
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 885 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Potts, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Legal Aid or
Public Defender, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 491, 500-01 (1950), quoting from Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); 43 TEXAS L. REV. 243 (1964). See
also Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1950); Kamisar,
The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The
Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 37-67 (1962).
8. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Mm. L. REV. 1, 36-37
(1963); Mazor, The Right To Be Provided Counsel: Variations on a Familiar
Theme, 9 UTAH . REv. 50, 76 (1964); Note, The Representation of Indigent
Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HAny. L. REV. 579,
584-85 (1963).
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better job than could a lawyer.' This belief might be based upon
the observation of television shows or movie dramas which lead
him to think that he is capable of being a superpleader or that a
criminal trial is a simple matter. Or it might stem from a belief
or hope that the jury will be sympathetic toward a layman who
pits himself against the Goliath of the state.6 Alternatively, the
defendant may believe counsel to be unnecessary because of a
blind faith in his own innocence and the infallibility of the judicial
system.7 The experienced and wily defendant may refuse counsel
to lay a foundation for later attack upon the conviction." Finally,
the waiver may reflect a desire to avoid delay before starting to
serve a prison sentence or obtaining a release on probation9 or
arise simply from a desire to save money.'o
This Note considers whether defendants have a right to waive
counsel and proceed in person; if so, upon what foundation it rests
and whether it is an absolute right or is qualified in some fashion;
and if qualified, the nature of the qualification. Finally, the pro-
cedures appropriate for the use of trial courts to safeguard both
the defendant's right to counsel and any right he may possess to
proceed without counsel are examined.
I. RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT
A number of courts have recognized the right of criminal de-
fendants to waive counsel and proceed in person. In Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann," the Supreme Court referred to
"the right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to
dispense with a lawyer's help." 2 In United States v. Plattner,"a
the Second Circuit recently held that the right to proceed pro se
4. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 270
(1942); Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1950).
5. See Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and
Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DUQuESNE L. REV. 245, 255 (1964).
6. Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 479, 136 N.W. 166, 173 (1912).
7. Laub, supra note 5.
8. See Sanchez v. United States, 311 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); Kamisar & Choper, supra note 3, at 35 n.153.
9. Mazor, supra note 8, at 77.
10. See United States v. Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 559, 567-68 (D. Nev.),
af'd, 295 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962); State v.
Meeks, 245 Iowa 1231, 1240, 65 N.W.2d 76, 81, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 902
(1954); Kamisar & Choper, supra note 3, at 26.
11. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
12. Id. at 279.
13. 330 Fad 971 (2d Cir. 1964) (Medina, J.).
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is implicit in the fifth and sixth amendments. The court noted:
[W]e hold the right to act pro se ... is a right arising out of the Federal
Constitution and not the mere product of legislation or judicial deci-
s1on. . . .
Under the Fifth Amendment, no person may be deprived of liberty
without due process of law. Minimum requirements of due process
in federal criminal trials are set forth in the Sixth Amendment. . . .
Implicit in both amendments is the right of the accused personally
to manage and conduct his own defense in a criminal case.
... [The right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment] was
surely not intended to limit in any way the absolute and primary
right to conduct one's own defense in propria persona.14
Another court has granted habeas corpus for failure to allow a pro
se defense, recognizing the opportunity to defend oneself as "one of
the most elementary prerequisites of a fair trial.""' A number of
state constitutions provide that a criminal defendant may defend
in person or by counsel, some adding "or both."' Two cases have
been found reversing convictions for failure to allow defendants to
proceed alone on the ground that this constituted a violation of
such constitutional provisions. 7 The right of a defendant to pro-
ceed without counsel in federal courts is given by the Judicial
Code, which provides that "in all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel . . . ."' The Ninth Circuit has reversed a conviction be-
cause of the trial court's failure to accede to the defendant's re-
quest to dismiss his counsel, emphasizing that the statute gives
to an accused "an unquestioned right to defend himself," and
several other cases have stated that the statutory right is absolute
or unqualified 0
14. Id. at 273-74.
15. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp. 851, 854
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
16. For a classification of and citations to provisions in 37 state constitu-
tions, see United States v. Plattner, 380 F.2d 271, 275 & nn.6-8 (2d Cir. 1964).
See also BEANMHy, RIGHT TO CouNsEL 209, 287 (1955); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d
1288 (1961).
17. State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954); State v.
Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 285, 100 N.W.2d 121 (1960) (alternative holding).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1958). Further, rule 44 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides: "If the defendant appears in court without
counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel
to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
19. Reynolds v. United States, 267 F.2d 235, 236 (9th Cir. 1959).
20. E.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 938 (2d Cir. 1963);
Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838
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Although it is quite plain that the federal statute and many
state constitutions confer the right to proceed alone, it is far from
clear that the federal constitution extends such a right. It cer-
tainly does not do so explicitly. Reliance upon the reference in
Adams to the "correlative right" to sustain the proposition that
it does so implicitly2n may be unwarranted, for clearly a right cor-
relative to a constitutional right need not itself be constitutional.22
Further doubt is cast upon the "correlative right" rationale by the
recent Supreme Court decision in Singer v. United States,2 3 where
the petitioner argued that the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury implied a correlative constitutional right to refuse a jury
trial. A unanimous Court rejected his contention, noting that "the
ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry
with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right."
Yet this right, resting upon the defendant's interest in being
accorded treatment as a person possessing human dignity, appears
so fundamental as arguably to be a requisite of due process. 25 The
Adams Court recognized the interest of the defendant in making a
"free choice" as a "self determining individual"26 and that to deny
a defendant "in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense
with some of these safeguards . .. although he reasonably deems
himself the best advisor of his own needs, is to imprison a man
in his privileges and call it the Constitution." 7 It must be borne
in mind that in the final analysis the defendant himself is the
person who stands to suffer the most from an improvident choice
(1968); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on other
grounds, 841 U.S. 494 (1951); Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948)
(dictum).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1964);
Egan v. Teets, 251 F.2d 571, 578 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1957) (assuming without
deciding); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 1948);
Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944) (dictum).
22. See Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 n.2 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959) (finding the right statutory and not constitu-
tional).
23. 85 Sup. Ct. 783 (1965).
24. Id. at 790.
25. See Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 511-11a, 199 N.W.2d 175, 184
(1964). See MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 935 (1959), where the court said, "Clearly, we think, it would be a
denial of due process of law for the court to refuse to permit the accused
... to defend himself and, instead, require him to accept the services of in-
experienced and incompetent counsel . . . ."
26. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).
27. Id. at 280. See Laub, supra note 5, at 256.
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to reject counsel.28
II. QUALIFICATIONS UPON THE RIGHT
While it is well established that there is some right to proceed
without counsel, a number of cases indicate the existence of
qualifications on the right where countervailing interests are in-
volved. The fundamental basis of these interests seems to be
society's interest in the integrity of the truth-determining proc-
ess. 9
A. INTEREST IN ORDERLY PROCEDURE AT TRIL
One facet of this interest is the need to have the trial proceed
in an orderly fashion. Underlaying this concern is the belief that
only through an orderly exposition of the issues can society be
adequately assured that the truth has been determined. Thus it
has been said that the defendant's right to represent himself "is
not so absolute that it must be recognized when to do so would
jeopardize a fair trial of the issues."30
There is a considerable body of federal case law31 and some
state authority32 holding that although there may be a broad right
before trial commences to elect to defend pro se, the disposition
of a request to dismiss counsel after trial has begun is completely
within the discretion of the trial court. Several reasons have been
given for permitting the trial court to refuse the defendant's re-
quest in the latter situation: the trial might become confused or
confounded;33 the case is "too complicated to allow self-representa-
28. See Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 511-11a, 129 N.W.2d 175, 184
(1964).
29. See Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 179 (1946).
30. State v. White, 86 NJ. Super. 410, - , 207 A.2d 178, 183 (App.
Div. 1965). But see Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented
and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DuQuEsNE L. Ruv. 245 (1964).
31. E.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1963);
Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
838 (1963); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1950),
af'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
82. E.g., People v. Warner, 134 Cal. App. 2d 829, 831, 286 P.2d 560, 561
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955), cert. denied, 851 U.S. 912 (1956); State v. Townley,
149 Minn. 5, 182 N.W. 773, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 643 (1921).
33. See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 283-34 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); People v. Warner, supra note 32, at 831, 286
P.2d at 561.
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tion;"34 or the defendant might take undue advantage of an oppor-
tunity to represent himself, as for example by making assertions
of fact unsupported by the evidence.3
Despite the distinction which has been drawn between a re-
quest made before trial to proceed pro se and a request to dismiss
counsel during trial, all the reasons enumerated above for allowing
the court to deny a defendant's request to dismiss counsel during
trial would be equally applicable to a request made at the outset.
It is just as likely that the trial will be confused, the case compli-
cated, or the assertions of material fact unsworn when the request
precedes trial as when it is made after the trial has begun. It
might be sought to justify the distinction on the ground that a
defendant who commences trial with counsel has made a binding
election. However, this argument not only begs the question but
is irrelevant to the asserted ground for refusing to permit a de-
fendant to dismiss his counsel, viz., to promote the fair adminis-
tration of justice by maintaining the order and decorum of the
court.
At least one federal case has recognized the applicability of the
arguments based upon securing the orderly administration of
justice to cases where the request to proceed alone was made be-
fore trial. In United States v. Private Brands, Inc.," the defendant
had been represented by attorneys for some time, but requested
prior to trial that he be allowed to proceed pro se. The court rea-
soned that "an accused's right to represent himself is not so ab-
solute that it must be recognized when to do so would disrupt the
court's business."37 Several state courts have also recognized a
limitation on the right of a defendant to waive counsel before trial
where interference with the orderly disposition of the case is
threatened. 8
B. INTEREST IN PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
In addition to the need for orderly procedure at trial, the
interest of society in the proper administration of justice extends
34. See Butler v. United States, 317 F.ed 249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 838 (1963).
35. See State v. Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 23, 182 N.W. 773, 781, cert. de-
nied, 257 U.S. 643 (1921).
86. 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958).
37. Id. at 557. But see United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 277 (2d
Cir. 1964).
38. People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 873, 143 N.E.2d 289, 247 (1957);
State v. White, 86 N.J. Super, 410, -, 207 A.2d 178, 188 (App. Div. 1965);
McCann v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282, 285, 189 N.E.2d 148, 145 (1963).
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to full protection of the rights of the accused. This means that
weight must be given the social interest in establishing the defend-
ant's innocence if he is innocent or, if he is guilty, in his being
punished only for that of which he is guilty, and in securing for
him in all cases the full range of "due process of law." Although a
defendant's conviction and punishment primarily affect him,
"more than the rights of an accused are involved in a criminal
case." 9
1. Denial of Incompetent Waiver Attempts
It has been established by numerous decisions that a defendant
will be allowed to proceed without counsel only if he has an in-
telligent understanding of the consequences of his doing so.40 This
qualification is based upon the constitutional right of an accused
to counsel. The Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabaman established
that a conviction will not necessarily be upheld merely because the
defendant did not take the initiative to request counsel.4 2 The
Powell Court noted the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants
involved in the case before it and stated: "the right to have coun-
sel appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the con-
stitutional right to be heard by counsel."4 This rationale is equally
applicable to a case where the defendant purports to waive counsel
but does not fully understand the consequences of so doing. As was
said by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst:"4
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused -
whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting
89. Brown v. United States, 264 Fad 363, 869 (D.C. Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
40. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160-62 (1957); von Moltke
v. Gilies, 382 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (opinion of Black, J.); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d
Cir. 1964); People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P.2d 918, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1961); Ware v. State, 235 Md. 181, -, 200 A.2d 664, 665 (1964); Annot.,
93 L. Ed. 137, 140-44 (1950).
The cases could be read to require not only an intelligent understanding
of the consequences of waiver but also an ability on the part of the defendant
to proceed alone. However, such an interpretation would seem to limit un-
duly the right of the defendant to proceed without counsel. See text ac-
companying notes 80-83 infra.
41. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
42. See generally Annot., Duty To Advise of Right to Counsel, 8 A.L.R.2d
1003 (1949).
43. 287 U.S. at 72.
44. 804 U.S. 458 (1938).
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duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial
judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver by the accused. .. ."
This approach represents a necessary balance of the interests
concerned. It is no real burden to require that defendants capable
of understanding the consequences of waiver be made aware of
these consequences before deciding what course to pursue. As for
defendants incapable of understanding these consequences, the
interest of society in achieving justice outweighs any interest an
individual might have in proceeding without counsel in ignorance
of the serious consequences of this choice.
Careful examination of even those cases in which the right to
proceed without counsel has been accorded federal constitutional
status shows that the qualification of competent waiver must be
appended to the right. In Adams the Court noted that the defend-
ant had studied law and had declared that he "was sufficiently
familiar therewith adequately to defend himself, and was more
familiar with the complicated facts of his case than any attorney
could ever be,""4 and concluded that a defendant "may waive his
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open... ." Even in
Plattner, which makes the strongest case for a constitutional right
to proceed without counsel, the court quoted Adams and noted
that if the defendant says he wants to waive counsel and defend
personally, the trial court "should conduct some sort of inquiry
bearing upon the defendant's capacity to make an intelligent
choice... . It was concluded that the defendant plainly met this
test, being "quite evidently both intelligent and articulate," and
likely to have "probed deeper [than his counsel] had he been given
an opportunity to conduct the cross-examination himself....
The other two cases relying upon the federal constitution for a
right to proceed alone do not state that defendant must under-
stand the consequences of so proceeding; however, they involve
defendants who clearly did so understand. In oneso defendant was
found to be a college-educated journalist with a "considerable,
though at times faulty and inaccurate, knowledge of law. .. ," and
45. Id. at 465. See also People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 859 P.2d 918, 11
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961).
46. 317 U.S. at 270.
47. Id. at 279. (Emphasis added.)
48. 830 F.2d at 276.
49. Id. at 277.
50. MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
935 (1959).
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with fairly extensive experience before criminal courts, and in the
other" defendant was an ex-convict and handled himself well
during his colloquys with the trial judge.
There is language in several cases characterizing the federal
statutory right to proceed pro se as absolute or unqualified.5 2
Nevertheless, it is plain that statutory and state constitutional
provisions must be construed so as to give full effect to the consti-
tutional right to counsel and its corollary that a defendant may
not proceed alone unless he has competently waived that right.
Moreover, there is no hint in any case where it has been held that
the defendant was wrongfully denied a statutory or state constitu-
tional right to proceed alone that he was not fully competent to
waive; on the contrary, the facts of most indicate that he was. In
one the court made an express finding that defendant "voluntarily,
intelligently, and effectively waived . . . ," based upon his "mental
alertness and capacity to know and understand his rights,"
familiarity with criminal procedures, and "full knowledge and
understanding of the danger and possible pitfalls of representing
himself";" in another, defendant was a college professor accused
of violating an AEC regulation prohibiting citizens from entering
nuclear test areas. 4
2. Competence: An Intelligent Appreciation of the Consequences
When a trial court is confronted with a defendant who asserts
his desire to waive counsel, it must steer carefully between the
Scylla of denying the defendant's substantial right to determine
his own fate and the Charybdis of violating the constitutional
right to counsel of a person who does not validly waive this right.
Consequently a consideration of the prerequisites for a competent
waiver of counsel is important.
Since valid waiver implies an intentional relinquishment of a
right," it plainly may not be made without knowledge of its
consequences. It may therefore be viewed as a truism that a valid
waiver of counsel may not be made unless the accused knows that
51. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
52. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
58. State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 2S5, 238, 100 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1960).
54. Reynolds v. United States, 267 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1959), reversing
169 F. Supp. 479 (D. Hawaii 1958). In State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281,
272 P.d 195 (1954), the statement of facts is insufficient to evaluate the de-
fendant's competence.
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Williams v. Alabama,
341 F.2d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1965).
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he has a right to counsel, including appointed counsel if he is
indigent.' But it is also clear that in addition to the knowledge
that he has a choice between proceeding with counsel and pro-
ceeding alone, the defendant must realize exactly what he is
foregoing when he waives the assistance of counsel.57 In von
Moltke v. Gillies," in which petitioner disclaimed desire for
counsel and pleaded guilty, Mr. Justice Black noted that for a
waiver to be valid, it
must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the
statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punish-
ments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances
in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the whole matter.59
This formulation or one similar to it has been approved by a
number of courts.60 However, some courts have rejected portions
of it.
A broadside attack was leveled against it by the Indiana
Supreme Court,6 ' which did not feel bound by Justice Black's
statement in von Moltke, since it was not supported by a ma-
jority of the Court.6 2 The Indiana court was faced with a de-
56. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S.
786 (1945); United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 Red 803 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964). See generally Note, 31 U. CnI. L.
REV. 591 (1964).
57. But see People v. Terry, 224 Cal. App. 2d 415, 418, 36 Cal. Rptr. 722,
724 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964), where the trial court had attempted to explain
much more than the mere availability of a choice to an apparently dull de-
fendant, but the reviewing court was satisfied by a showing that the trial
court "had made clear to him, beyond any possible confusion resulting from
his lack of language facility, that he must choose between representation by
his then counsel or by himself." Cf. United States v. McGee, 242 F.d 520
(7th Cir.), vacated & remanded per curiam, 355 U.S. 17 (1957); Hoelscher
v. Howard, 155 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1946).
58. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
59. Id. at 724. Only three justices joined with Mr. Justice Black in the
plurality opinion. Two justices, in a separate opinion, called for further
findings on whether petitioner's waiver and guilty plea were based, as she
alleged, upon misinformation received from the government attorney as to
the nature of the offense charged.
60. See, e.g., Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1949); People
v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P.2d 913, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961); Common-
wealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964); State
ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 126 N.W.2d 91 (1964). It has been
emphasized that knowledge of the nature of the charges must not be merely
superficial. See Voigt v. Webb, 47 F. Supp. 743, 747 (E.D. Wash. 1942);
People v. Chesser, 29 Cal. 2d 815, 823, 178 P.2d 761, 765 (1947).
61. Carter v. State, 248 Ind. 584, 187 N.E.2d 482 (1963).
62. Id. at 587, 187 N.E.2d at 483; see note 58 supra; cf. United States
fendant who asserted that his alleged waiver was ineffective be-
cause he had not been informed as to related charges and included
offenses, the penalties and possible defenses to such charges, "and
all other matters essential to a full understanding of the services
which an attorney might perform in his behalf." 3 The court held
that these assertions were not grounds for reversal, rejecting any
suggestion that a criminal defendant must be given "the same
complete legal briefing on his case by the court as would be
given by counsel.""
More selective divergences from the standard set forth in
von Moltke take the form of attempts to shorten the list of
matters with which the defendant must be familiar. The com-
ponent most often sought to be eliminated is that requiring
knowledge of possible defenses. Some courts have stated that
once the defendant has competently waived, the court is no
longer obligated to inform him of possible defenses," one court
reasoning that since it is not the duty of the judge to point out
possible defenses to a defendant represented by counsel there
is no duty to a defendant proceeding alone after having waived."
But this misses the point that if defendant was not informed
as to these matters, then he did not have a full knowledge of the
relevant facts upon which to base his decision to waive. In any
event, the question whether knowledge of defenses is required
should have been considered settled since the Supreme Court
in 1957 found a sufficient ground for reversal in defendant's
allegation that his alleged waiver was made in ignorance of the
"independent contractor" defense to the crime with which he
was charged - embezzling funds of a common carrier in inter-
state commerce.67
Another matter which it has been sought to strike from the
list is knowledge of the degrees of the offense. A waiver has been
v. McGee, 242 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir.), vacated & remanded per curiam,
355 U.S. 17 (1957).
63. 243 Ind. at 585, 187 N.E.2d at 483.
64. Id. at 586, 187 N.E.2d at 483; cf. United States v. Redfield, 197 F.
Supp. 559, 572 (D. Nev.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 803 (1962). In Gates v. State, 243 Ind. 325, 330, 183 N.E.2d 601, 604
(1962), the court said that all a defendant needs to know is "the nature of
the charge against him, the punishment for that specific offense, and his
right to have an attorney to advise him concerning the law, if he so desires."
65. Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950); Gates
v. State, 243 Ind. 325, 183 N.E.2d 601 (1962); cf. People v. Sherman, 211
Cal. App. 2d 419, 27 Cal. Rptr. 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
66. Michener v. United States, 181 FR2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950).
67. United States v. McGee, 355 U.S. 17 (per curiam), vacating &
remanding 242 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1957).
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held effective despite its being made in ignorance of the fact that
there were degrees of homicide in the state concerned and that
on an indictment of first degree murder one could be found guilty
of a lesser offense."8 But it would seem that defendant does not
fully appreciate what he is foregoing if he does not know that
the charges are reducible.
A defendant should be allowed to proceed without counsel
only if he has an intelligent understanding of what an attorney
could do for him. It is not sufficient that he has a vague notion
that lawyers are sometimes of assistance in such matters or that
he realizes he is facing serious charges or that he is in danger of
grave punishment.
But it is equally insufficient alone that accused has been ex-
posed, either by the court or from another source, to complete
information regarding the consequences of his waiver. He must
also possess an intelligent appreciation of the significance of
these consequences. A lack of ability so to appreciate may
exist either when the facts are such that the average layman
could comprehend them but the defendant is below average and
thus cannot do so,"o or when the facts are so complex that al-
though defendant is fairly intelligent he, being a layman, cannot
comprehend them.71 In Rice v. Olson,72 one of the Supreme
Court's reasons for refusing to find a valid waiver was that the
defendant's defense involved a question "obviously beyond the
capacity of even an intelligent and educated layman ... ."' It
68. Hoelscher v. Howard, 155 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1946).
-9. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961).
70. Sanders v. United States, 873 U.S. 1 (1968) (defendant mentally in-
competent due to narcotics administered in jail); Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d
867 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (inference that minors lack capacity); United States
ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 228 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (low IQ); United
States v. Vargas, 124 F. Supp. 195 (D.P.R. 1954) (lack of education, could
not speak English); People v. Amos, 21 App. Div. 2d 80, 249 N.Y.S.2d 740
(1964) (16 year-old mental defective); see Annot., 71 AIL.R.2d 1160 (1960);
cf. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). But see Hayden v. State, 201
N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 1964) (rebuttal of inference that minor lacks capacity by
evidence of his being "worldly-wise"); In re Mears, 124 Vt. 131, 198 A.2d
27 (1964) (parent acting as guardian ad litem may waive for minor).
71. See Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, -, 202
A.2d 808, 806 (1964) ("mature, intelligent" defendant "inadequately prepared
to meet the serious challenge presented"); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. ed 491,
511b, 19 N.W.2d 175, 185 (1964) (defendant, apparently normal, did not
appreciate "realities of a criminal prosecution"); of. Sanchez v. United States
311 F.2d 327, 832 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 873 U.S. 949 (1963).
72. 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
73. Id. at 789.
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follows that in some cases, because of either the nature of the
defendant or of the case, presence of counsel is mandatory.
S. Proposed Classification of Defendants by Competence To
Waive
For convenience, defendants attempting to waive may be
classified into three groups. One type could be called fully com-
petent. This defendant, a rare individual, possesses a sufficient
knowledge and understanding of the requisite facts to enable
him fully to realize the consequences of foregoing legal assistance
in facing the charges in question. Another type of defendant
might be termed the marginal defendant. He is intelligent enough
to apprehend the consequences of proceeding alone if advised
of them; but he has no present knowledge of them. Marginal
defendants are not a homogeneous group; differences exist in the
quantum of facts and intelligence possessed by various indi-
viduals comprising the group, so that more comprehensive ex-
planation will have to be given some than others to transform
them into fully competent defendants. If the defendant is of this
type, he must be given the type of explanation necessary to make
him understand the situation," even if this is more explanation
than would be necessary for another marginal defendant. A third
type, the submarginal defendant, lacks the ability to appreciate
the consequences of his proceeding without counsel. Given the
complicated and highly specialized nature of the legal proceedings
which must be comprehended, it is clear that many persons who
meet the standards of mental ability applied in other areas of
law may be submarginal for purposes of waiving counsel.
The only type of defendant who should be permitted to waive
is the fully competent defendant, because only he has the requi-
site knowledge and appreciation of the consequences of waiver.
The marginal defendant may be transformed by proper and
effective explanation into a fully competent defendant, but until
this transformation occurs he may not waive, even though a
"mature, intelligent individual"7 5 or an "intelligent, mentally
acute" person.70
Probably the primary cause of poor results in the waiver area
is the failure on the part of some courts to recognize the distinc-
74. See United States ex rel. Lynch v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 277, 281
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 284 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1960).
75. Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, -, 202 A.2d
303, 306 (1964).
76. von Moltke v. Gillies, 382 U.S. 708, 720 (1948) (opinion of Black, J.).
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tions between these classes. Some courts have affirmed con-
victions of defendants who quite clearly were not exposed to the
requisite facts on the ground that they were intelligent,7 7 which
is to treat the marginal defendant as if he were fully competent.
Further, a number of courts have been guilty of treating sub-
marginal defendants as if they were marginal by affirming con-
victions where the defendants seem clearly to have been incom-
petent to understand the facts on the ground that the trial court
did explain the facts."
4. Inadequate Defense at Trial
In reviewing cases in which defendants proceed to trial with-
out counsel, appellate courts often determine whether due proc-
ess was accorded the defendant in terms of whether he had a
"fair trial."7 9 In the vast majority of cases this is simply another
way of examining whether or not the defendant competently
waived his right to counsel. Indeed, a poor showing at trial may
well be the best evidence that the defendant lacked an intelligent
understanding of the consequences of proceeding without coun-
sel.80 However, a case may arise in which a defendant com-
petently waives counsel but, as it develops at trial, is unable
actually to handle the case himself. Where the trial court can
anticipate this failure it may be within its prerogative to require
counsel to ensure a fair trial. But extension of forced appoint-
77. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 242 Fad 520 (7th Cir.), vacated
& remanded per curiam, 355 U.S. 17 (1957); cf. Burstein v. United States,
178 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1950), in which the court observed that although
defendant's "ideas of a defense were extraordinarily unorthodox, he was alert
and intelligent."
78. See, e.g., Post v. Boles, 332 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964) (tolerably literate
confessional statement); United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Rundle, 230 F. Supp.
323 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (defendant had fifth grade education); People v. Terry,
224 Cal. App. 2d 415, 36 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (slow defendant
with lack of language facility); State v. McDonald, 343 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1961)
(defendant had gone to the sixth grade-seemed extremely confused).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 335 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1964);
Stephenson v. State, 4 Ohio App. 128, 129-30 (1915); Commonwealth ex rel.
McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, -, 202 A.2d 303, 306 (1964); of. State v.
White, 86 N.J. Super. 410, -, 207 A.2d 178, 184 (App. Div. 1965); McCann
v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282, 285, 189 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1963).
80. See Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, -, 202
A.2d 803, 306 (1964); of. People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P.2d 913, 11
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961). But see United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Rundle, 230
F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1964); United States v. Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 559,
572 (D. Nev.), aff'd, 295 F.d 249 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803
(1962).
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ments of counsel to every case where it is anticipated that de-
fendant may not do as well as a lawyer could easily eliminate
altogether the right of a defendant to proceed pro se. Conse-
quently, absent a threat to the orderliness of the trial,s' the de-
fendant should ordinarily be permitted to proceed to trial alone
where competent to understand the consequences of doing so.
Only when the resulting trial amounts to a travesty of justice
should an appellate court feel compelled to find a denial of due
process. Since a reversal may be obtained in the case where
counsel, presumably thought to be competent when appointed
or retained, proved incompetent in his conduct of the trial,"8 due
process may also be violated where a defendant competently
waives counsel but then proceeds to conduct a defense that
amounts to no defense at all. However, in a case where a de-
fendant has waived counsel, he has chosen to rely on his own
ability; the situation where counsel has proven to be incompetent
has been out of his hands, particularly when counsel was ap-
pointed." Thus the defendant who competently chose to proceed
alone should be required to show a much more compelling case
to obtain a new trial than the defendant who claims his ap-
pointed counsel was inadequate. In most cases competence to
waive will coincide with the ability to present an adequate de-
fense; the societal interest in according all defendants a fair trial
may occasionally require a reversal, but should not permit the
experienced defendant to argue his own case and then obtain a
new trial on right to counsel grounds if he loses.
III. PROPER PROCEDURE FOR THE TRIAL COURT
The most significant question raised by the principles dis-
cussed above relates to the procedure the trial court should
follow in discharging its protective duty 4 when confronted by a
defendant without counsel. As one observer has remarked, the
method used to inform defendant of his right to appointed or
retained counsel "is not merely an administrative detail," because
"if there is a failure of communication, the purposes of affording
81. See text accompanying notes 30-38 supra.
82. See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Ray. 289
(1964); Note, 89 IND. LJ. 134, 153-56 (1963).
83. Several courts have distinguished between appointed and retained
counsel on the issue of whether inadequate counsel will merit a reversal. This
distinction has been criticized as unwarranted. See Waltz, supra note 82, at
2906-301.
84. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
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him the assistance of counsel will be thwarted with a perverse
effect, for the more ignorant and innocent will suffer while the
wily and experienced take advantage of the offer."85
A. EXPLANATION AND INQURY INTO DEFENDANT'S
UNDERSTANDING BY THE COURT
The trial judge's responsibility does not end when told by an
accused that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to
waive that right. The court must go beyond routine inquiry and
"investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of
the case before him demand" to determine that defendant appre-
hends all the consequences of his proceedings without the assist-
ance of counsel."8 In order fully to inform the defendant of
these consequences, the trial court should make known all facts
which bear on the value of counsel and which might reasonably
affect a defendant's decision whether to proceed without coun-
sel.87
The investigation that should and easily can be a part of the
trial judge's explanatory procedure serves the important function
of enabling the judge to determine to which class the defendant
before him belongs - fully competent, marginal, or submar-
ginal."8 As a part of this procedure it would be wise for the court
to inquire into the defendant's motives for wishing to waive"
to ensure that no waiver is based upon erroneous preconceptions.
If the defendant is found to be fully competent, the judge may
allow him to waive immediately. If a marginal defendant is in-
volved, the judge should continue his explanation to prevent him
from waiving until he has attained the status of full competence.
On the other hand, if the defendant is found to be submarginal,
the judge should see that the defendant receives the aid of coun-
sel9 0 He may cease explanation and appoint counsel as soon as
it is clear that the defendant is of this type, bearing in mind
85. Mazor, The Right To Be Provided Counsel: Variations on a Familiar
Theme, 9 UTAH L. REv. 50, 75 (1964).
86. von Moltke v. Gillies, 32 U.S. 708, 728-24 (1948) (opinion of Black,
J.); see People v. Hardin, 207 Cal. App. Rd 886, 840, 24 Cal. Rptr. 563, 566
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
87. See notes 57, 58, 60 & 64 supra and text accompanying notes 55-68
supra.
88. See Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 902 A.2d
303 (1964).
89. See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
90. If defendant has sufficient funds, he may be required against his will
to retain counsel. People v. Mitman, 184 Cal. App. 2d 685, 7 Cal. Rptr. 712
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960). It does not seem objectionable that defendant thus may
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that this type comprises more than just those defendants who
are not sui juris.
Admittedly, it may sometimes be inconvenient for a court
to have to follow these practices. But in view of the seriousness
of the consequences to the parties involved and because of the
necessity of determining the truth, a certain amount of incon-
venience must be tolerated. It also must be borne in mind that
the incidence of waiver may be reduced to insignificance if the
trial judge genuinely encourages defendants to avail themselves
of counsel.9 '
B. WAivEn By DEFENDANTS WIsENG To STAND TRALn
The consequences of proceeding without counsel are probably
as great for the defendant planning to plead guilty as for one who
plans to plead not guilty? 2 This is so because of the danger that
matters such as defenses and circumstances in mitigation will
be hidden by the guilty plea" and because of the significance of
legal services such as securing reduced charges in return for the
guilty plea and representing the defendant's interests in regard
to sentence, probation, and parole determinations 4
Yet trial courts may feel justified in treating differently the
defendant who wishes to waive and plead guilty and the rare
defendant who wishes to waive and plead not guilty.95 The de-
fendant who wishes to plead not guilty and proceed to trial with-
out counsel must know about the evidentiary and procedural
niceties of the courtroom." Thus it would seem proper for the
have to pay for legal services he does not want. See Kamisar & Choper, Right
to Counsel in Minnesota. Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations,
48 Munm. L. REv. 1, 26 (1963). Surely the defendant who must have counsel
to protect his rights should not receive free counsel if able to pay merely
because he refuses to retain counsel. Of. United States v. Sampson, 161 F.
Supp. P16 (D.D.C. 1958).
91. Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 35 & n.153; see Note, 76 HAv.
L. RLv. 579, 584-85 (1963).
92. See von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (opinion of Black,
J.); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945). However, in Gibbs v. Burke,
837 U.S. 773, 781 (1949), the Court said, "A defendant who pleads not guilty
and elects to go to trial is usually more in need of the assistance of a lawyer
than is one who pleads guilty."
93. See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945).
94. See Note, 76 HAny. L. REv. 579, 597 (1963); 43 TEXAS L. Bav. 243,
244 (1964).
95. A survey has shown that far fewer of the defendants who waive plead
not guilty than guilty. Note, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 579 (1963).
96. Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 511b, 129 N.W.2d 175, 185 (1964).
In People v. Terry, 224 Cal. App. 2d 415, 418, S6 Cal. Rptr. 722, 724 (Dist.
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trial court to inform the defendant who wishes to proceed without
counsel of all the consequences of this choice other than those
relating to trial procedure before permitting him to plead. If it
is then clear that he comprehends them and still desires to pro-
ceed alone, he may be asked to plead. If he pleads not guilty,
the judge must explain and determine whether the defendant
comprehends the consequences of proceeding to trial without
counsel.
C. AUTOIATIC PROVISION OF COUNSE1
An alternative approach used by a considerable number of
judges is to appoint counsel automatically, in the case of the
indigent defendant,17 or direct defendant to secure counsel, if he
has the means to do so. 8 A pragmatic reason for automatic pro-
vision of counsel is that since a great many defendants, especially
indigents, are probably not competent to waive at any rate,"9 and
since few defendants waive if they are genuinely encouraged to
have counsel, 0 it saves time to provide counsel as a matter of
course.' More significantly, it has been viewed as proper that
someone other than the judge explain to a defendant the desira-
bility of legal assistance in his case 0 2 because of the danger that
Ct. App. 1964), the court stated that a court is "under an obligation to ex-
plain to a defendant who desires to represent himself the difficulties he will
encounter . . . ."
97. Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 34-35. The practice is approved
in Mazor, supra note 85, at 77; Note, 76 HARV. L. REv. 579, 597 (1963).
98. See United States v. Sampson, 161 F. Supp. 216, 217 (D.D.C. 1958);
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 27.
99. In Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 511a, 129 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1964),
the court said that "it is highly important to consider that many persons
lack the capacity to evaluate intelligently their circumstances during the
course of a criminal prosecution." See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 26;
Potts, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Legal Aid or Public Defender, 28
TEXAS 1. REv. 491, 500-01 (1950).
100. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 35 n.153.
101. Some judges go considerably further, refusing to permit waiver.
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 35, 36 n.155. According to BODENHEIMER,
MANUAL FOR USTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF UTAH 91 (1956), the
"established practice" in Utah is to allow no waiver in capital cases. Other
judges "almost insist" that counsel be appointed. Elison, Assigned Counsel in
Montana: The Law and the Practice, 26 MoNT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018, which forbids acceptance of guilty pleas in
capital or life-without-parole cases unless the defendant is represented by
counsel.
102. Mazor, supra note 85, at 76.
a defendant will disclose an opinion as to his guilt in such a
discussion.'s
Even when counsel is automatically provided a defendant may
still fully assert his right to proceed pro se. Counsel is appointed
in the first instance to confer with him as to the advisability of
retaining counsel for the trial. If the defendant decides to pro-
ceed alone after consultation, he would be free so to indicate.""-
Of course the court still must ascertain at this point whether
the defendant sufficiently appreciates the consequences of waiver.
This arrangement does, however, lead to the possibility that
the defendant will never be informed of his right to proceed
alone. It would seem that a defendant competent to waive and
defend without prejudicing the order and decorum of the court
must be aware of his right to do so if the right is to have any
real content. But there is little authority for this proposition, 05
and it has been held that a reversal for failure to inform of the
right to proceed alone probably could be had only where the
defendant can show resulting substantial prejudice.. 6
D. ADvisoRY CouNsEl
Another procedure that has been utilized in the case of a
defendant who wants to represent himself is to appoint a lawyer
to sit beside him during the trial to advise him.' This approach
has been praised0 s and works well in cases where the defendant
has competently waived.'0 9 It has also worked where defendant
probably did not waive competently, but after a short and fairly
103. See State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d
91, 95 (1964).
104. People v. York, 207 Cal. App. 2d 880, 24 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); see Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 36 n.155. But see
note 101 supra.
105. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum);
Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369-70 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
106. Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 911 (1959). But defendant is generally not required to show prejudice to
secure reversal for failure to grant his express request to defend in person.
E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 267 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1959); State v. Thom-
linson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121 (1960); State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d
281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954). But see People v. Marcus, 133 Cal. App. 2d 579,
583, 284 P.2d 848, 850-51 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); of. People v. Mullane, 220
Cal. App. 2d 637, 34 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
107. Kamisar & Choper, supra note 90, at 36.
108. Note, 76 H.Anv. L. REv. 579, 585 (1963).
109. See, e.g., People v. Kenzik, 92 Ill. 2d 567, 177 N.E.2d 162 (1961).
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unsuccessful attempt to represent himself put himself into the
attorney's care."" But in the latter situation it is only by chance
that the method works well; if defendant is stubborn quite a dif-
ferent situation may develop, yielding extremely poor defense
presentation, sometimes leading to reversal."' In the case of the
marginal or submarginal defendant who is adamant in his efforts
to proceed without the aid of the advisory counsel provided for
him, the net effect is the same as if no counsel at all had been
afforded. The fact that the court saw to it that an attorney sat
mutely by defendant's side while he unsuccessfully tried his own
cause seems to be something less than what the Constitution
requires in granting the right to counsel to all who have not
competently waived counsel. Thus, this approach must not be
used in lieu of a performance by the court of its duty to determine
whether the defendant has competently waived, but should be
used only where a competent waiver is made.
Several cases indicate that courts are not bound to appoint
advisory counsel upon a defendant's request,x22 and this is
probably wise, since it would be a waste of manpower to require
an attorney to sit through a trial in circumstances in which he
will probably not be called upon to perform any services."13 But
in a case where it appears the defendant will make use of advisory
help, it may be desirable for the trial court, in its discretion, to
extend this service.
CONCLUSION
Balancing the individual's interest in being allowed to govern
his own affairs against society's interest in the achievement of
criminal justice may be a difficult task for the courts. But it is
one that can be neither avoided nor delegated. Although the
110. People v. Evans, 211 Cal. App. 2d 534, 27 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
Ill. In Davis v. State, 368 P.2d 519 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962), advisory
counsel was appointed to assist a defendant who alternatively thought
Jesus Christ would defend him and that he himself was Jesus Christ, but the
defendant made no use of his attorney and no attempt to examine or chal-
lenge jurors, to cross-examine or to make an opening statement. But see
People v. Terry, 224 Cal. App. 2d 415, 86 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Dist. Ct. App.
,1964), where a conviction was affirmed despite defendant's refusal to make
use of his advisory attorney and the ineptness of his own defense.
112. See Shelton v. United States, 205 F.d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
846 U.S. 892 (1953); People v. McFerran, 211 Cal. App. 2d 4, 26 Cal. Rptr.
914 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
113. See Shelton v. United States, supra note 112, at 813.
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"right" to proceed without counsel is subject to recognized quali-
fications and may lack foundation in the federal constitution,
the free choice of a competent individual is entitled to great
deference in our society. Such a right is provided by federal
statutes and in many state constitutions. A proper interpretation
of these authorities should require that the defendant be allowed
to handle his own defense if he does not take undue advantage
of this right to the serious prejudice of the order and decorum
of the trial, and if he makes the decision to do so with knowledge
of all its consequences, including an understanding of all the
services an attorney would be able to perform for him. But if the
defendant is found wanting in any of these matters, an attorney
must represent him, even if this is contrary to the defendant's
wishes. He must not be allowed to proceed in an ignorance which
may cause untold harm, not only to himself and those who have
a substantial interest in his life and freedom, but also to the
integrity of the judicial system as a truth-determining process.
